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Abstract 
The Dutch East India Company or VOC in 1602 showed many characteristics of modern 
corporations, including limited liability, freely transferable shares, and well-defined 
managerial functions. However, we challenge the notion of the VOC as the precursor of 
modern corporations to argue that the company was a hybrid, combining elements from 
traditional partnerships with a governance structure modeled on existing public-private 
partnerships. The company’s charter reflected this hybrid structure in the preeminent 
position given to the Estates General as the VOC’s main principal, to the detriment of 
shareholders’ interests. Protests by Isaac le Maire and Willem Usselinx about the board’s 
disregard for shareholders rooted in a conviction that it ought to conform to traditional 
partnerships with their judicious balance between stakeholders’ interests. However, the 
perceived public interest of a strong military presence in Asia prevented shareholders’ 
protests from changing the corporate governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Dutch Republic’s successful Asian trade during the 17th century is often considered a 
direct result of the creation, in 1602, of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) with a 
permanent capital, freely transferable shares, a separation of ownership and management, 
the shielding of corporate assets from creditors, and a limited liability for shareholders 
and directors (Van Brakel 1908, 1912; Van der Heijden 1908; Gaastra 2009; Den Heijer 
2005). These features enabled the company to set up permanent trading posts for 
administration, storage, and ships’ maintenance; to coordinate the activities of employees 
working in a variety of locations; and to mobilize the resources for establishing a strong 
military presence in Asia. The long-lasting, capital intensive commercial enterprise thus 
created, and the huge profits it generated for most of its existence, have led economic and 
legal historians to consider the governance structure of this company a necessary 
precondition for its economic success, and an important step in the evolution of the 
modern corporation. 
 During the early years, however, the company’s policy and corporate governance 
attracted sharp criticism from shareholders. Within a few years a number of leading 
shareholders left the board because of disagreements over the direction of operations. In 
1609 Isaac le Maire sent a long memo to the Republic’s highest civil servant, Grand 
Pensionary Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, complaining about the board’s highhanded and 
misguided policy.2 Subsequently Le Maire attempted to force the board to change tack by 
launching his famous bear raid on VOC shares (Van Dillen 1930). The debate on the 
formation of an Atlantic trade company, the West-Indische Compagnie or WIC, also 
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shows a keen awareness that its corporate governance structure should be fundamentally 
different from that of the VOC. Indeed, the main advocate for a WIC, Willem Usselinx, 
hammered time and again on the need to give shareholders power over the companies 
they owned (Van Rees 1868). Finally, during the 1620s disgruntled shareholders fought 
hard to get more power over policy, ultimately in vain (Van Rees 1868, 144-172).  
In this paper, we want to take a fresh look at the supposed character of the VOC 
as a pioneering joint-stock limited liability company (naamloze vennootschap or NV in 
Dutch). Paul Frentrop’s book already did important groundwork for this, but he took the 
foundation of the VOC in 1602 as his point of departure, whereas, to gain perspective, we 
would want to know what went on before and connect this with what came later 
(Frentrop 2003). Traditionally, the historiography of Dutch corporate development 
regards the VOC as the first example of an NV and sees this form of organization as 
crucial to its economic success. Scholars broadly agree about the legal pedigree of the 
VOC. The company was essentially a private partnership with additional features, such as 
the limited liability for directors and for shareholders derived from various older forms of 
business organization (Den Heijer 2005, 35-36, Steensgaard 1982, De Vries and Van der 
Woude 1997, Van Brakel 1908, 1912, 1914, 1917, Van der Heijden 1908, 1917, Asser 
1983; see however Lehmann 1895 and Mansvelt 1922). However, opinions differ as to 
the precise evolutionary path, i.e. which feature emerged why, when, and whence; and 
about origins, motivations and evolutions of particular features, such as limited liability.3 
Moreover, we think that by looking at the relationship between agents and various 
principals within the company we can clear up the reigning confusion as to the 
provenance of these governance features, i.e. where exactly the VOC fits in the 
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evolutionary path of Dutch corporate law. The notion of agency dates at least back to 
Jensen and Mecking (1976), in which firms are described as ‘nexus of contracts’. The 
agency literature models contracting and agency costs under assumptions of asymmetric 
information and divergent interests (an overview in Becht, Bolton and Röell 2003). 
Analyzing the VOC from this perspective gives us a better understanding of where 
exactly the VOC fits in the evolutionary path of Dutch corporate law.  
Our analysis shows that the corporate governance norms which Le Maire and 
Usselinx wanted applied were common in other business organizations, such as the 
partnerships with additional features. The VOC deviated from these norms because of its 
essentially hybrid character as a private corporation entrusted with a public task, i.e. 
taking the war against Spain overseas by establishing a colonial empire in Asia (Van 
Rees 1868, 20-29, Van Brakel 1908, 20-22, Steensgaard 1982, 244-247, De Vries and 
Van der Woude 1997, 384-386, Israel 1989, 70-72, Van Goor 2002, Den Heijer 2005, 67-
68). This aim inspired a governance structure modeled on semi-public institutions such as 
the local admiralty boards which coordinated the activities of the Dutch navy from the 
late 16th century onwards, the water boards which managed dikes and drainage, and on 
the polder boards which ran land reclamation projects (Fockeman Andreae 1975, 26-30, 
49-50, 114-116, 125, 139-140, 142, Van Zwet 2009, 55-58, 76-84). Company directors 
therefore really faced two principals: the shareholders and the Estates General, the 
highest political institution in the Dutch Republic. With the investors’ capital tied up for 
ten years and local elites dominating the general board of directors, the Estates General 
quickly emerged as the main principal. As a result corporate governance features 
common at the time and common in modern corporations were sacrificed for political 
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aims. Commercially-oriented shareholders vilified the company’s policy but they were no 
match for the war-party with its control of the general board and direct access to the 
Estates General. 
 
THE STRETCH OF TRADITIONAL PARTNERSHIPS 
 
During the second half of the 16th century merchants in Britain and the Habsburg 
Netherlands began to explore new markets in Russia, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the 
coast of West Africa. These ventures carried considerable risk because of violence at sea, 
stark fluctuations in supply and demand, and the difficult monitoring of partners and 
employees trading in the distant markets. To manage these risks, British and Dutch 
merchants amended existing partnership contracts with additional clauses about the 
purpose and duration of the venture, the capital invested by the partners, the division of 
work between them and, for those who contributed labor rather than capital, their share in 
profits and losses. The earliest British trade with Guinea, for instance, was organized as 
temporary partnerships, which arranged a number of voyages counting two to five ships 
between 1553 and 1567. Upon their return accounts were drawn up and any profits split 
as agreed in the contract (Scott 1968, 3-9). The Flemish merchants pioneering Antwerp’s 
trade with Narva during the 1560s also set up temporary partnerships with a small 
number of participants. The duration of and the capital invested in these companies 
increased with the familiarity between the partners, but even close relatives apparently 
preferred contracts for a limited time period with a clearly defined purpose (Wijnroks 
2005, 65-105, Brulez 1959, 363-365, 557-558, Denucé 1938, xxii-xxvii).  
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Specific-purpose partnerships, compagnia in Italian parlance, were ideally suited 
to fund commercial expeditions to poorly known destinations (Lopez 1971, 74, Lopez 
and Raymond 1955, 175, 291, De Roover 1963, 139-140, 260-261, Hunt 1994, 
Lazzareschi 1947, 11-13).4 They could be established by private contract and, in its most 
restrictive form, comprised a single voyage only. Just like general partnerships defined in 
Roman law, the partners in a compagnia remained severally and jointly liable for each 
others’ actions as long as these actions were in accordance with the purpose and duration 
of the company contract (De Roover 1963, 142, 145). This emendation of the general 
partnership’s rules had become accepted practice in Antwerp as early as 1537, for an 
accounting manual published in that year stated that ‘There is no difference between the 
rule of a partnership with specified duration (metter tyt) and without specified duration 
(sonder tyt), except that shares are taken for a certain period, and the revenue is 
calculated according to this share’ (Vanden Hoecke 1537, quoted in Goris 1925, 105n).  
Partnerships also split tasks, for instance when the partners were separated by 
distance, when they employed an agent elsewhere, or when the collaboration was just a 
sideline for one or more partners (Nanninga Uitterdijk 1904, 529, Van Brakel 1912, 1914, 
1917, Brulez 1959, 366-368). Merchants commonly had constantly shifting partnerships, 
some short-term and for particular purposes, such as a single voyage or the joint handling 
of a cargo load, others for longer terms and broader purposes, say the trade in one 
commodity with a particular country. To minimize internal control problems arising from 
the division of labour, merchants used a range of solutions drawn from experience. 
Remuneration schemes were jigged to provide incentives, while partnership contracts 
stipulated the obligations of partners-managers towards the joint enterprise in broad terms, 
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referring to a general obligation to manage a business and its administration in good faith, 
with due diligence, and in conformity with the style or custom of merchants. During the 
second half of the 16th century a very important form of limited liability developed for 
partnerships, in that principals could claim not to be liable for obligations which agents 
had incurred outside the partnership’s purpose (Van Brakel 1908, 161-170, Van Brakel 
1914, 168-169, Van der Heijden 1908, 50-56, Asser 1983, 88-89, 95-103, 115-119, 
Riemersma 1952, 335-337). 
 Partnership contracts were enforced by customary law and mercantile usage. One 
key custom was the requirement for proper account keeping coupled to the acceptance of 
ledgers, account books, and supporting documentation such as bills, account extracts, and 
correspondence as legal proof in litigation (Gelderblom fortcoming). The status of legal 
proof made archives valuable, so contemporary depictions of merchant offices always 
show voluminous archives. The gradual adoption of double-entry bookkeeping, 
facilitated by the publishing of practical handbooks such as the manuals of Jan Ympyn 
(Antwerp 1543) and Claes Pietersz (Amsterdam 1576), made business accounts far more 
transparent and thus easier to check (Jonker and Sluyterman 2000, 18, Gelderblom 
forthcoming). Proper account keeping provided the basis for other self-evident norms. 
Business partners had full access to all documents at all times plus a mutual obligation to 
draw up comprehensive annual accounts. Such annual reckoning was so normal that 
contracts only mentioned exceptions, for instance the settling of accounts after the 
liquidation of a shipping expedition of uncertain length, or after the number of years a 
particular venture would run (Van Brakel 1914, 165, 179, 182-183, 184-185, De Jonge 
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1862, 97 article 24). Similarly, merchants keeping current accounts with each other 
customarily exchanged account extracts for approval.  
At this stage rulers in Britain and the Netherlands maintained some distance to 
new commercial ventures. Philip II left the Antwerp companies to their own devices as 
long as they did not harm the Spanish monopoly in the Americas. Nothing changed in 
1577 when Calvinists took control of Antwerp’s magistrate. In Britain Queen Elizabeth 
did contribute ships to the first African voyages but her participation was considered no 
different from that of other investors. She also granted a corporate charter to the Muscovy 
Company in 1555 so its members could negotiate privileges in Russia. This did not alter 
the company’s financial organization. The merchants continued to organize separate 
voyages liquidated on return. In 1581 this model was transplanted to the Mediterranean 
trade with the merger of the Levant Company and the Venice Company. Despite earning 
fees from incorporation the Crown did not renew the Levant Company’s charter. By 1592 
the company functioned as a licensing agency which merely coordinated the protection of 
private trade (Scott 1968 II, 88). 
Until the 1580s merchants in Holland had largely concentrated on trade between 
the Baltic and France, Spain, and Portugal. This trade was organized by individual 
merchants, small family partnerships, and shipping companies or partenrederijen. It is 
tempting to view these shipping companies as a distinct legal entity, but the term 
partenrederij is a 19th century invention. The underlying contract was a partnership with 
a specific purpose, in this case the exploitation of a ship, and particular only in the 
arithmetical division of shares (1/2, 1/4, 1/8th, etc.). The accounts of shipping companies 
were settled after a specific trip or after a trading season, following which participants 
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were free to reinvest or not. As with all specific-purpose partnerships the partners were 
jointly and severally liable for debts related to the purpose of the company, with one key 
exception. Any loss of cargo would be spread over all freight owners, while a total loss of 
the ship would free all shipping partners from any remaining claims on the company.5 
These two features of shipping companies appear to have been quite general in European 
maritime law, but in addition Dutch shipping partners enjoyed a particular form of 
limited liability. If the company faced claims exceeding the value of their investment, the 
partners could free themselves from having to pay the excess amount by abandoning their 
share. Participants in land reclamation ventures had the same right (Dekker and Baetens 
2009, 65).  
Following the fall of Antwerp in 1585 Amsterdam emerged as the new long-
distance trade centre in the Low Countries. Antwerp merchants migrated north and 
continued their trade with Russia, the Levant, and Africa from the Dutch port. The Russia 
trade continued to be dominated by Antwerp firms, and the earliest voyages to Genoa and 
Venice in the 1590s were also organized by Flemish companies. Merchants in the long-
distance trade were mostly left to their own devices, but to support the Levant trade the 
government sometimes supplied arms to individual ships, and it negotiated commercial 
privileges with the Ottoman sultan. The same was true for the Atlantic world. The early 
sugar expeditions to the Canaries, Madeira, and Brazil, and the first voyages to West-
Africa were run by special purpose partnerships, and the salt trade to the coast of 
Venezuela was done by shipping companies (Van Goor 1997, 18-23, Gelderblom 2000, 
179-181). Between 1593 and 1598 at least thirty ships sailed to West Africa from 
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Amsterdam, Enkhuizen, Hoorn, Rotterdam, Middelburg, and Delft (Den Heijer 2005, 31, 
Van Goor 1997, 22). 
Surviving accounts reveal that investments in the African trade were typically 
made for one voyage, with the capital raised in advance and spent on the ship, its 
equipment, crew, armament, and merchandise (Unger 1940, Van Gelder 1916, 208). A 
small number of partners coordinated the expedition, for which they received a small fee. 
Upon the return of the ship the same men notified the other participants, sold the cargo 
and sometimes also the ship, and distributed the proceeds among their fellow investors.6 
The early success of these early African companies quickly raised concerns about 
increasing competition. In 1598 the eight companies then trading between Amsterdam 
and Africa decided to merge into a General Guinea Company so as to avoid competition, 
as director Jacques de Velaer explained to shareholder Daniël van der Meulen (Unger 
1940, 208-209). The new company maintained the governance structure of the previous 
companies and organized single voyages only. 
These ventures were all private enterprises, with little or no government 
involvement. The various companies sailing to Africa armed their own ships and sailed in 
convoy whenever possible; government support was initially limited to naval escorts in 
European waters for incoming and outgoing ships (Van Gelder 1916, 241).7 Until 1598 
the companies were exempt from the customs duties levied by the admiralty boards 
which ran the navy, but once a regular trade had been established they had to contribute.  
In addition to this Prince Maurice in 1596 and 1598 secretly supported two expeditions 
by the Antwerp merchant Balthasar de Moucheron to establish fortified trading posts on 
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the Principe and São Tomé off the coast of Guinea. Both attempts failed, as did an 
expedition equipped by the Estates General in 1599. 
 
THE EARLY VOYAGES TO ASIA 
 
The government played a more active role in the trade with Asia (Den Heijer 2005, 21). 
Three successive attempts to find a northernwestern passage to Asia were backed with 
public money supplementing private investment (RSG 1593-1595, 337, 16 May 1594). 
Officials also supported companies exploring the ordinary route to Asia via the Cape of 
Good Hope. The admiralties gave ordnance on loan, sold one or two ships on favorable 
terms, and granted exemption from customs duties (Den Heijer 2005, 29). In addition the 
admiralties provided regulations for coordinating the fleet and for securing discipline on 
board.8 The early companies also borrowed ordnance from various cities, with the Estates 
General sometimes providing guarantees.9 The funding of the early voyages to Asia was 
entirely a private matter, however, and organized as special purpose partnerships. 
Between 1595 and 1601 a total of 66 ships sailed from Amsterdam, Middelburg, and 
Rotterdam to Asia. 
Small groups of merchants formed these partnerships by drawing in relatives, 
business associates and, for the first expedition, the entire crew of the four ships involved, 
since the company withheld two months’ wages as venture capital (De Jonge 1862, 97, 
article 24). Though canvassed by directors and presumably attracted by their business 
standing, subscribers were not beholden to the directors but to the partnership.10 The 
success of most early companies made them attractive propositions. The Amsterdam 
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ventures did not lose a single ship and merchants who invested in all expeditions earned 
an average annual return of 27 per cent, stimulating shareholders to roll their profits from 
one voyage into the next. As with the other long-distance ventures, the directors rendered 
accounts and paid out the profits after each trip, before asking investors whether they 
wanted to take part in a new venture.11  
The lead merchants each had a specific task in the company, for which they were 
remunerated with a percentage of the value of the money and goods handled.12 The 
Amsterdam Oude Compagnie had four committees of managers or bewindhebbers 
respectively for equipping the ships, for hiring crew members, for purchasing supplies, 
and for the outgoing cargo. The tasks were assigned to directors on the basis of their 
knowledge and skills: local merchants took care of shipping matters, two Antwerp traders 
were in charge of the ships’ cargo. All directors were expected to help unloading the 
spices on the ships’ return, and some of them were charged with storing the leftover 
provisions and victuals.13  
The directors’ personal credit provided a vital ingredient to the early expeditions. 
They paid for supplies from their own purse and charged interest on these advances, or 
else obtained them with suppliers’ credit.14 Once shipments had returned from Asia 
rebates on cash payments for spices bought provided additional liquidity.15 Shareholders 
also advanced money to their company. In November 1601 the directors of the Verenigde 
Amsterdamse Compagnie paid interest to participants who paid their instalments early.16 
They also borrowed to purchase specie for sending to Asia.17 Such credit transactions 
reveal the limits of the partnerships that organized the early voyages. Because the 
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participants were jointly and severally liable for company debts, the directors preferred to 
use their personal credit, which curtailed the total.18 
Only a few shareholders managed the early companies, as the directors’ 
resolutions for the Amsterdam Oude Compagnie show. The book does mention a general 
assembly on December 7, 1598, but since the remainder of the text concerns directors’ 
decisions this term probably did not mean a meeting of all shareholders.19 However, 
some directors appear to have been more powerful than others. The collegie, a committee 
formed by the four directors responsible for recruitment, appears to have evolved into an 
executive committee.20 The other three committees each ran their own business, but could 
turn to the collegie for solving difficulties.21 This evolution seems to have caused 
disagreement. Several resolutions were needed to ensure that the appointment of the 
expedition’s commanding officer, the shipmasters, and the principal merchants would be 
made by jointly by all directors.22 From at least 1599 an Amsterdam magistrate, Reynier 
Pauw, acted as president of the collegie, in which position he could convene the board of 
directors and probably also act in public on the company’s behalf.23 
 The gradual articulation of governing large partnerships was taken a step further 
by the First United East India Company (Eerste Verenigde Compagnie op Oost-Indië), 
formed by a merger between Amsterdam’s Oude Compagnie and a venture run by 
Flemish immigrants, the Nieuwe Compagnie, in 1601.24 With no fewer than 23 directors, 
the new company needed stronger coordination. Pauw again acted as president of the 
collegie, which now had the authority to give instructions about interest payments on 
shareholders’ installments, and about the accounts to be rendered by the subcommittees.25  
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CONSOLIDATION: THE VOC 
 
In the long-distance trade merchants could not concentrate on business alone, they had to 
organize armed protection as well and thus break the state monopoly on violence. 
Amsterdam enabled companies to do this by keeping a rein on them through the 
magistrates on their boards, very much in the style of the admiralties. With the growing 
military and economic importance of the Asian trade this arm’s length governing no 
longer sufficed. In 1597 Van Oldenbarnevelt started pushing for a consolidation because 
the continuing competition threatened to compromise the Dutch fight against Spain and 
Portugal in Asia (Den Heijer 2005, 41). The companies of Middelburg and Veere 
followed the Amsterdam example and merged into one Verenigde Zeeuwse Compagnie in 
1600. The idea for a merger between the all companies, first considered in 1599, then 
reappeared, given new momentum by the emergence of the East India Company in 
Britain. Like the early Dutch companies, the British company organized single voyages, 
or series of two or three voyages, but always with full accounts presented upon 
completion. A permanent joint stock concern was only created in 1657, tied to clear rules 
about the accountability of its directors (Scott 1968 II, 128-132).  
 Negotiations between the Dutch companies took a long time because of 
conflicting demands. Firstly, the Estates General wanted the merger to secure a strong 
Dutch presence in Asia. The hot rivalry between the voorcompagnieën undermined the 
country’s fragile political unity and economic prosperity, and seriously limited the 
prospects of competing successfully against other Asian traders from Europe. By 
attacking the Luso-Hispanic overseas empire, a large, united company would also help in 
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the ongoing war against the Spanish Habsburgs. Initially Van Oldenbarnevelt thought of 
no more than two or three manned strongholds (Van Deventer 1862, 301), but the Estates 
General wanted an offensive (Van Brakel 1908, 20-21). Secondly, the Republic’s 
political fragmentation meant that the merger terms needed careful tailoring to vested 
financial and commercial interests in the various towns and provinces concerned. The 
solution adopted mirrored the organization of the admiralties. The company was made up 
of six local chambers running operations and delegating directors to a central board. 
Thirdly, all merchant active in the Asian trade needed to join if the new concern’s 
monopoly was to work, and some were loath to give up their lucrative business. Balthasar 
de Moucheron, for instance, even set his own terms for joining and got them, only to 
walk out within a year over a policy disagreement (De Jonge 1862, 267, 282-283). 
Fourthly, the directors of existing companies sought to protect their own positions as 
managers of a lucrative commercial enterprise. According to Willem Usselinx, a large 
merchant well versed in the intercontinental trade, the VOC charter was drafted by 
bewindhebbers bent on defending their own interests and the Estate s General had 
allowed that to pass so as to achieve the desired merger (Van Rees 1868, 410). An 
agreement was finally reached on March 20th, 1602, after which the Estates General 
issued a charter granting a monopoly on the Asian trade for 21 years (Gaastra 2009, 21-
23).  
The VOC charter is often considered a blueprint for the governance structure of 
the company, perhaps even the founding act of the world’s first corporation with modern 
features such as a permanent capital, entity shielding, separation of ownership and 
management, freely transferable shares, and limited liability. We will discuss these 
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features in more detail below, but want to emphasize two points here. First, the VOC’s 
corporate governance must be understood by reading the charter in tandem with the 
preamble to the share subscription ledgers of the company’s six local chambers. The 
merger negotiators clearly drafted this text during the negotiations, for the two surviving 
copies are identical Van Dillen 1958, 205-206, Unger 1946-1948, 13-14). 
The charter and the preamble served very different purposes and highlight the 
VOC’s character as a hybrid, a private commercial company with superimposed public 
responsibilities. Shareholders were no party to the charter; this was a contract between 
the directors and the Estates General. Indeed, during the 1620s conflict with shareholders 
the bewindhebbers even claimed that they, and not shareholders or the company, owned 
the charter.26 The shareholders put their name under the preamble, thereby agreeing to 
put their money in the company for a period of ten years and to submit to its subscription 
conditions, which included a detailed procedure for transferring shares. Though investors 
will have known the terms of the charter, from the preamble the company looked like any 
other special-purpose partnership, a compagnia established with a specific purpose for a 
set number of years.  
Second, the financial structure as laid down by the charter did not really differ 
from preceding long-distance trading partnerships. The VOC’s capital was not intended 
to be permanent, but revolving in three consecutive and separate accounts: one for the 
fourteen ships which sailed in 1602; one for the decade starting in April 1602; and one 
for the period 1612-1622. Shareholders in the 1602 expedition had the right to take their 
money back on its return (charter article 9).27 Shareholders in the VOC received the right 
to have their money back on the presentation of full accounts for the first 10-year period 
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in 1612 (article 7). These terms were not fundamentally different from the four year turn-
over time of earlier expeditions to Asia, only longer. The longer timespan was probably 
the reason for defining a share transfer procedure, though the speed with which share 
trading developed after the VOC’s launch suggests that a demand for easy transferability 
of shares had already manifested itself before (Gelderblom and Jonker 2004).  
 
AGENCY PROBLEMS IN THE VOC CHARTER 
 
If the preamble made the VOC look like a customary partnership, the company’s charter 
laid down an entirely different form, a judicious compromise between, on the one hand, a 
partnership, and existing public bodies on the other. Given the importance of the VOC’s 
political and military aims, and its monopoly, the company had to have some form of 
public status. The concept of a government department for the Asian trade similar to the 
Spanish Casa de India, i.e. an agency licensing private expeditions and financing warfare 
with the licence revenues, was dropped during the merger talks for reasons unknown (De 
Jonge 1862, 257-261).28 Amending the customary partnership to secure official influence 
on private business must have appeared the logical and obvious solution. This was 
exactly what the admiralties, water boards, and polder boards did: providing public goods 
by levying duties for their use. Those boards were administered jointly by representatives 
from the parties concerned and officials appointed by local authorities. Similar 
organizations were later set up for the Baltic and Levant trades (Van Tielhof 2002, 232-
248; Veluwenkamp 2000, 183).  
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With the VOC, however, the Estates General did not put representatives on the 
board of directors, but chose to anchor public control in the charter (Den Heijer 2005, 50). 
As a result the charter showed a heavy imbalance between the three main stakeholders: 
the bewindhebbers or shareholder-directors; the investors, i.e. the shareholders and 
bondholders; and the state in the form of the Estates General.  
Out of the 46 charter articles, 29 dealt with various aspects of corporate 
governance and the stakeholders’ positions.29 It stands out that the Estates General meant 
to keep a close rein; after all, the VOC received suzerain rights overseas, the right to 
wage war and make treaties.30 Four corporate governance clauses tied the VOC closely to 
the authorities at various levels. Article 6 gave the Estates General powers to overrule the 
bewindhebbers or managing directors. Under articles 15 and 16 the company had to 
supply data about incoming goods and about sales revenues to the provincial and city 
authorities if their inhabitants had supplied 50,000 guilders capital or more. If those 
authorities chose to appoint someone to organize share subscriptions for the company, 
that agent had a right to full financial information so as to keep the authorities, but not the 
shareholders, informed. In the end these two clauses remained dead letters. Finally, 
article 26 gave the right to appoint directors to the provincial estates.  
 A second feature which stands out is that the charter devoted attention to the VOC 
shareholders in only six of the 46 articles.31 No. 10 laid down the subscription procedure. 
The charter said nothing about the shareholders’ right to information or a right of 
representation on the board, presumably because the public interest of limiting the spread 
of sensitive information about war and other policy considerations weighed heavier than 
the private interests of shareholders. As for financial information, Van Oldenbarnevelt 
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had wanted annual statements of equipment costs and product sales followed by full 
accounts after ten years (Van Deventer 1862, 303), but the charter only gave shareholders 
a right to full accounts in 1612. Two articles defined exit rights. In addition to the right to 
sell shares stipulated in the preamble to the subscription register, shareholders were given 
a general exit right after the 1612 accounts (No. 7), while as we have seen the 
shareholders in the 1602 expedition could opt out (No. 9). Article 14 detailed some 
conditions for the intracompany accounts and for the statutory accounts to be presented to 
shareholders in 1612, and No. 17 gave shareholders a right to a dividend once the 
available cash reached five per cent of capital.32 One curious article (No. 27) stipulated 
that small shareholders had the same rights as big ones when it came to sharing in the 
company’s expected benefits. This was no doubt inserted to counter the existing practice, 
widely decried in the late 1590s, to carve up the sale of spices between the directors (Van 
Dillen 1930, 358-359). The charter clearly envisaged the VOC raising debt, as other 
private-public partnerships did, and denied the directors commission on such transactions 
(No. 30), but said nothing about bondholders or the priority of their claims over those of 
shareholders in case of bankruptcy. 
 Thus there existed a quite wide discrepancy between the intentions of the 
subscription ledger preamble and the charter, the former reflecting the customary 
partnership of equals, the latter creating an entirely different structure in which the heavy 
hand of the state left shareholders with no influence at all. The shareholders must have 
known both texts, but we have no indications that they saw the potential problems which 
this discrepancy might raise. If anything they presumably considered the involvement of 
the Estates General as a boost to the new company’s chances of success in enforcing its 
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lucrative monopoly. In addition the prevailing informal nature of relations between 
managers and shareholders must have allayed any fears that they would be sidelined. The 
business communities of Dutch towns were close-knit. A 1616 play by the popular 
playwright Brederode portrayed a busy Amsterdam merchant running about town talking 
to his shareholders between closing deals (Jonker and Sluyterman 2000, 68). Backed up 
by the limited duration of enterprises such informal control mechanisms had worked well 
enough until then, and shareholders will have thought they would continue to do so.  
 
THE PROMINENT POSITION OF THE DIRECTORS 
 
As we have seen the directors’ function was a fairly recent corporate innovation in need 
of definition. The evolution from the first expedition to Asia in 1595, organized by nine 
Amsterdam merchants who had styled themselves as bewindhebbers different from the 
general body of shareholders, to the emergence of the executive committees chaired by 
Pauw had taken only six years. The emerging differentiation do not appear to have 
affected contemporary conceptions about the character of the association. Though 
separately remunerated for their managing tasks, the bewindhebbers continued to act as 
first among equals. One document refers to them as the agents of the participants, a point 
repeatedly emphasized by Usselinx as well (Van Dillen 1930, 354, Van Rees 1868, 416, 
446, 448, 451). In 1620 Usselinx described the WIC, then still in the project stage, as a 
gemeene rederije, perhaps best translated as a joint enterprise, in which all shareholders 
enjoyed equal rights of election and appointment. Consequently the directors ought to be 
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chosen by and from the shareholders; letting city councils appoint them violated that 
principle (Van Rees 1868, 416). 
One clear sign of a divide between directors and the other shareholders appeared 
in the articles of association of the first expedition in 1595. The text itself has not 
survived, but we know from a related set of regulations that the contract denied 
participants the right to demand full accounts from the directors until all goods had been 
sold, during which time the participants would also have to content themselves with such 
information as the board of directors was prepared to divulge.33 These clauses about 
accounting and about information sharing clearly served to highlight the fact that the 
company, by force of circumstance, deviated from the customary norms of full disclosure 
and annual accounts to partners. Everyone had to wait for up to two years until the ships 
had returned to European waters and sent fast-sailing yachts ahead with news and data. 
Once that had happened directors presumably gave participants a rough idea of the results, 
if only so as to secure their support for another venture.34  
However, the regulations also show a subtle change in the status of the company’s 
shareholders. The ban on the crew selling their shares before the return to port suggests 
that the exclusion of shareholders from the day-to-day running of the business was 
matched by an exit option in the form of freely transferable shares, possibly tied to an 
obligation to give the company an offer of first refusal (De Jonge 1862, 97, article 24). 
The exit option does not appear to have been exercised very often in the case of the 
voorcompagnieën, but at the launch of the VOC the trading option was considered so 
normal that, as we have seen, the charter did not even mention it (Gelderblom and Jonker 
2004, Van Dillen 1930, 355-356).  
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Exit options were a normal feature in shipping companies, as often as not tied to a 
right of first refusal for the other shareholders, but they made sense for partnerships only 
if these had made a clear distinction between partner-managers who could sign for the 
company, and sleeping partners who could not. This type of company became quite 
common; in 1610 Le Maire managed a whaling company with seven shareholders who 
traded their shares (Hart 1976, 211-212). The separation of functions probably led to a 
wider application of the limited liability principle. Common shareholders could not only 
claim this if directors went beyond the purpose of the partnership, but also because they 
were no longer in direct managerial control. The shareholder-managers must also have 
enjoyed internal limited liability, i.e. they could not be called on to pay more than their 
share, but they do not appear to have acquired limited external liability, that is they 
remained personally liable for a company’s obligations. In 1597 the prominent Rotterdam 
businessman Johan van der Veken petitioned the Estates General to release him from 
litigation over company debts since he ought not to be held personally liable for them, but 
we do not know whether his claim succeeded (De Jonge 1862, 239-240). The fact that 
article 42 the VOC charter expressly exempted the directors from personal liability 
suggests that the point needed articulation and did not follow automatically. Not 
everyone picked this up immediately. The Delft chamber of the Noordsche Compagnie, a 
whaling company set up in 1614, had apparently not exempted their directors from 
personal liability, so it became embroiled in a court case about the payment of beer 
ordered for the company’s ships during 1616 and 1617. The directors settled in 1625 by 
sharing the bill (Van Brakel 1909, 305-306, 339-348). 
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 By contrast, the VOC charter gave very extensive and detailed attention to the 
company’s directors. No fewer than 22 of the 29 corporate governance clauses concern 
the bewindhebbers in one way or another.35 Seven laid down the responsibilities of the 
board, the tasks and responsibilities of the individual directors, their oath of office, and 
their position as officials in having no personal liability for the company’s debts (No.’s 2, 
3, 6, 12, 27, 32, 33, 42). A further five detailed the directors’ remuneration and 
reimbursement arrangements (No.’s 5, 28, 29, 30, 31). Finally, several articles reflected 
the difficult merger negotiations leading to the complicated structure of six chambers, 
one for each city or region which brought its voorcompagnie into the merger (No.’s 1, 2). 
The bewindhebbers of those companies became the directors of the VOC, and the charter 
named all 76 of them (No.’s 18-26). Once natural attrition had whittled this number down 
to 60 provincial estates and city councils were to fill vacancies from a list of candidates 
proposed by the company. In an important deviation from normal practice in the Republic, 
directors sat for life, surprisingly so given the rotation schemes and limited appointment 
terms common to similar appointments.36 Each chamber delegated a set number of its 
directors to the regular meetings of the 17-strong executive committee.  
 The attention devoted to the directors was the outcome of several factors. First, 
the charter was drafted by a committee of directors from the voorcompagnieën keen to 
keep their hold on a lucrative enterprise and at the same time concerned with the risk of 
incurring unknown liabilities arising out of a company with an unusually long lifespan 
(De Jonge 1868, 262-281, RSH 1602-1603, 295-297). Second, as officers in a state-
sponsored enterprise the directors would occupy newly created, semi-public functions of 
major importance, if only because their position was unique in spanning the whole 
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Republic, not just one of its constituent provinces. No other business enjoyed excise 
privileges for the whole of the country (No. 41), or possessed the right to apprehend 
sailors on the run wherever it found them (No. 43). 
Third, reasons of state appear to have weighed very heavily indeed. With 12 
articles detailing the relations between the company and the Estates General or other 
authorities, the state really acted as the second principal for the directors as their agents 
and determined the balance of power within the company.37  
 
AN ADMIRALTY FOR ASIA 
 
Though the importance of the VOC as a semi-public enterprise has been emphasized 
before in the literature, the agency theory framework highlights the extent to which this 
biased the company’s corporate governance. Together with delegates from the various 
voorcompagnieën, representatives from the Estates General formed part of the committee 
which drafted the charter and which gave progress reports to the Estates; Van 
Oldenbarnevelt himself addressed the first meeting and chaired the last one (Van 
Deventer 1862, 303, De Jonge 1862, 262-281, Israel 1989, 70). Reasons of state, the 
desire to take the war to the Luso-Hispanic overseas empire and grab a Dutch empire 
there, brought the company into being and determined the way in which it was run in two 
ways, direct and indirect. First, in return for the monopoly plus other privileges and 
concessions such as the suzerain rights and tax breaks, the state received direct benefits: a 
small lump sum plus a range of instruments to guide policy.38 The provincial Estates 
appointed new bewindhebbers (No. 26), a right which Holland transferred to the 
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magistrates of cities with a VOC chamber (Gaastra 2009, 21). The Estates General could 
override board decisions (No. 6). Regional and local authorities could appoint agents to 
monitor the company (No. 15-16). As we have seen this failed to happen initially, though 
some provinces later succeeded in obtaining board representation (Gaastra 2009, 32). In 
addition the company had to submit reports about returning fleets to the Republic’s 
Admiralties and the commanding officer had to report in person to the Estates General 
(No.’s 36, 45).  
These articles amounted to a strong injunction forcing bewindhebbers to give 
priority to the Estates General’s wishes to the detriment of shareholders’ interests, both 
via monitoring and bonding. Though the bewindhebbers possessed an obvious 
information advantage over any other stakeholder in the VOC, they had a clear incentive 
to share this with the state, but not with the shareholders. The state could, and did, help 
them in numerous ways, large and small: providing ships and ordnance, promulgating 
sanctions to speed up tardy share subscriptions, financial assistance, tax benefits, and 
issuing regulations for trading the company’s shares, which included a ban on short 
selling after Le Maire’s raid.39 From 1609 the company received an annual subsidy of 
20,000 guilders, rising to 300,000 guilders by 1615 (De Jong 2005, 82, Table 3.5). 
Delegates from the bewindhebbers frequently attended the Estates General’s meetings: to 
supply information, give expert advice on a range of issues, or to get something done.40  
As for the indirect ways, the system for filling vacancies provided the authorities 
with strong leverage over the board. Giving the power to appoint directors to local 
authorities meant ensuring that board members would be ‘one of them’, recruited from 
candidates suitable for public office, i.e. men adhering to Calvinism, the dominant 
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religion, and fully aware that their career and the social position of their family depended 
on their success in maintaining the status quo. Rather than economic appointments, the 
directors’ positions became social and political assets, part of the glue binding the elite. 
As a result ties between magistrates and the VOC board were close indeed; as a rule two 
or even three of Amsterdam’s four mayors doubled as VOC directors (Gaastra 2009, 32, 
Gelderblom 1999, 246-247). It seems reasonable to assume that the directors’ interests 
included personal wealth maximization via transactions with the VOC (tunneling) and via 
direct expropriation. Examples of both surfaced over time, one of them in Le Maire’s 
petition. However, the patronage opportunities offered by their access to board seats were 
probably as important in guiding the behaviour of directors.  
Compared to that the shareholders’ position was very weak. The charter handed 
most governing rights to the Estates General, created a fundamental misalignment of 
directors’ and shareholders’ interests, and provided only the barest minimum of checks 
on managerial behaviour. Directors were required to keep a minimum shareholding as a 
guarantee for their oath of office and by extension for the proper conduct of their staff 
(No.’s 28, 33). As investors, bondholders and shareholders were jointly entitled to the 
financial surplus of the VOC’s operations. The charter gave no provisions at all to solve 
the potential conflict between competing claims of shareholders and bondholders. We 
know no more than that the bewindhebbers appear to have used bonds to favour preferred 
investors, who were keen on them because of the regular interest payments and good 
rates. Consequently we do not know either to what extent the VOC shareholders were 
residual claimants with respect to the bondholders. As we have noted, the shareholders’ 
statutory right to dividends if revenues amounted to five per cent of capital was ignored, 
27 
 
and they had very limited information and no voting rights. However, share trading gave 
investors a very convenient exit option.  
From a pure agency perspective, the weak position of shareholders opened an 
enormous potential for the expropriation of wealth from investors by the Estates General 
and the directors. Some of the ways in which that happened have already been noted; 
others follow below, and still more surfaced during the 1620s struggle with discontented 
shareholders, as shown elsewhere in this volume. One would expect investors to price 
protect against these agency costs, but poor data means that we cannot really see whether 
they did. The VOC’s shares were fairly rapidly subscribed and are reported to have 
traded substantially above par for some time after. The fact that the board asked the 
Estates General to prod tardy subscription payers suggests that some investors may have 
had second thoughts, but there simply is insufficient evidence one way or another. Share 
prices seem to have fluctuated with the general outlook of the company, i.e. news from 
Asia and rumours about dividend payments; to what extent agency issues had an impact 
we simply cannot say.  
 
CONFLICTING CONCEPTIONS 
 
Firmly in control of the company, the Estates General steered operations towards 
mounting war in Asia. During 1601-1602 successive expeditions had already engaged in 
skirmishes with Spanish and Portuguese ships; now the ongoing fight in Europe would be 
taken overseas with the express intention of, as Van Oldenbarnevelt put it, bleeding the 
Spanish resources (Van Deventer 1862, 311-313, Van Brakel 1908, 20-21). Accordingly 
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the admiral on the first expedition sent out received secret instructions, to be opened only 
after passing the Cape of Good Hope, for aggressive action going way beyond Van 
Oldenbarnevelt’s original couple of fortresses.41 It had been clear all along that the VOC 
would engage in war overseas; that was precisely the reason why three directors of the 
Amsterdam company declined to join its board (Gaastra 2009, 30). But the scale of the 
operations which the Estates General demanded went much further than anticipated. 
Consequently these demands soon created serious friction. The Estates General 
had to warn the company repeatedly to heed its instructions about a vigorous pursuit of 
the war (RSG 1604-1606, 224-225 (1604), 501-502 (1605). The VOC retaliated by 
presenting a bill for fortresses, soldiers, and armament maintained at the behest of the 
state, which resulted in a regular subsidy (RSG 1607-1609, 696, 896 (1609), De Jong 
2005, 82, Table 3.5). Two prominent directors and large shareholders resigned from the 
board shortly after each other: De Moucheron in 1603 and Le Maire in 1605, probably 
driven by despair over the company’s commercial prospects as a result of its military 
operations. Both attempted to move back into the Asian trade one way or the other, by 
sponsoring the launch of trade companies abroad, or by organizing naval expeditions to 
explore routes not covered in the VOC charter. These resignations prompted the VOC 
board in 1606 to ask the Estates General for an injunction against directors giving up 
their seats.42 Another prominent shareholder, Pieter Lintgens, sold out because, as a 
Baptist, he had conscientious objections to the VOC’s warfare; he also attempted to 
found a company abroad.43 By 1608 a disappointed VOC admiral strongly advised his 
successor not to try and combine business with war, since this was impossible. Realizing 
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this, the VOC board changed priorities and put war before trade (Van Brakel 1908, 21-22, 
De Jonge 1865, 233-240). 
 As a result the VOC’s commercial operations made little headway and no 
dividends were being paid, all the more galling since the 1602 expedition started 
showering dividends three years later on the shareholders who had wisely opted not to let 
their share be subsumed into the VOC.44 This must have caused uproar among the rest, 
who now knew that large amounts of money were coming in without being paid out. 
Combined with continuing bad news from Asia, the discontent over dividends appears to 
have pushed the company’s share price from 140 per cent in 1605 down to 80 in 1606 
(De Jonge 1865, 69). By 1610 and possibly a little earlier the board considered the 
VOC’s prospects to be so poor that it petitioned the Estates General to waive the accounts 
due in April 1612, fearing that disclosure would lead to a precipitous withdrawal of 
capital.45 The Estates initially resisted, demanding full accounts over the first ten-year 
period, annual accounts for the second ten-year period, the public advertising of sales, 
plus access to board meetings for selected members to represent shareholders’ interests 
(RSG 1610-1612, 604, 703). A decision was only taken in November 1613, when the 
Estates General, not wanting to weaken the VOC any further, authorized the company to 
continue without presenting accounts (RSG 1613-1616. 153, 154-155, 156, Van Rees 
1868, 47). It was only with this decision, taken in flagrant contravention of the charter, 
that the company’s capital became permanent, a momentous corporate innovation 
effected by state intervention. A subtle shift in terminology suggests that, at more or less 
the same time, the board also sought to redefine the position of the shareholders towards 
the company. Initially shares were known as partijen, i.e. literally parts in the company 
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similar to the parts shipowners held in a ship, and together the holders of parts or 
participanten formed the company. From 1606, however, the VOC started substituting 
the term actie or action-in-law for partijen, signifying that the holders were no longer 
considered a part of the company, but outside owners of a right to dividends 
(Colenbrander 1901, 386-387). Moreover, it looks as if directors tailored the amount of 
the company’s first dividend payments during 1610-1612 to acquit themselves of all 
claims from shareholders to be part of the company. Totalling 162.5 per cent by 1612, 
this amount neatly represented the paid-up capital plus the going rate of 6.25 per cent 
interest a year during ten years, so directors could argue they no longer owed 
shareholders anything.  
The experiences with the VOC were so disappointing overall that the initial plans 
to set up a similar company for the Atlantic trade envisaged a radically different 
corporate governance structure. In 1606 the Estates of Holland circulated a draft charter 
for a West India Company (WIC) (for the text see Meijer 1986, 50-59). The overall 
structure of the proposed company was to resemble that of the VOC. A single-tier board 
of bewindhebbers headed the company, with day-to-day decisions delegated to a 
committee of seventeen. In the VOC this board operated more or less independently, but 
the draft charter envisaged giving the WIC shareholders power over it in two ways. First, 
the bewindhebbers would no longer be appointed by city councils or provincial estates, 
but elected by and from shareholders with a minimum holding of two to four thousand 
guilders, depending on the chamber in which they had invested. A third of the 
bewindhebbers would seek re-election every two years (Meijer 1986, 55, articles 17-19). 
Usselinx, as keen an advocate of shareholders’ rights as Le Maire but more articulate and 
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persistent, saw regular board elections by shareholders as a guarantee that directors 
would not act as masters of other people’s money, like they did in the VOC, but as agents, 
as they should (Van Rees 1868, 448, 451, Ligtenberg 1914, Jameson 1887). Second, the 
large shareholders would elect a supervisory board of hoofdparticipanten or leading 
shareholders to audit the accounts and discuss policy with the bewindhebbers, the first 
manifestation of the two-tier board so characteristic of Dutch corporate governance today 
(Meijer 1986, 55-56, articles 21, 23-26).46 The draft also proposed keeping separate 
accounts for the commercial activities and for warfare, and presenting full accounts every 
six years. Finally shareholders would get a dividend if profits reached ten per cent of 
capital, as originally proposed for the VOC but lowered to five per cent in the charter, 
which latter threshold had clearly proved too low (Meijer 1986, 56, article 22, De Jonge 
1862, 266, 273).47 Even Le Maire’s scathing profit estimate of no more than 2.3 million 
guilders over seven years meant that the company ought to have paid the statutory 
dividend in most years and thus had formally transgressed its charter, giving shareholders 
another legitimate cause for complaint (Shareholder Rights 2009, 45). The figure was 
therefore doubled so the WIC could conserve cash.  
The company sketched in the 1606 blueprint was intended to function in tandem 
with a public body governing trade and warfare, the link between the two being provided 
by a board member appointed by the Estates General.48 Clearly official thinking now 
accepted the undesirability of combining politics with business and consequently split the 
two tasks over separate bodies. This new insight and the consequent greater weight given 
to shareholders’ interests can only be understood as an attempt to remedy perceived 
shortcomings in the VOC charter of four years before. It shows that a more balanced 
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model of corporate governance giving more power to the shareholders was not only 
conceivable, but in fact conceived. The fact that the Estates of Holland issued the draft 
also shows that these shortcomings were sufficiently serious to warrant official 
attention.49 
Le Maire’s 1609 diatribe and innovative bear raid on the VOC shares of the same 
year thus formed part of a groundswell of discontent. Indeed, Le Maire’s criticism about 
corporate governance appears quite muted, all the more remarkable for the fact that he 
continued to hold 85,000 guilders worth of shares, which he sold only during 1610, 
presumably to fulfill obligations arising from his bear raid.50 He subordinated his 
corporate governance criticism to his main concern, that the VOC’s monopoly should be 
restricted and not, as the board wanted, extended. Big merchants such as he and De 
Moucheron were keen to get the scope of the intercontinental trade widened and chafed at 
the unremunerative VOC monopoly. But perhaps Le Maire also decided to focus the 
main thrust of his arguments on what he wanted to achieve most, because he realized that 
demands for corporate governance changes stood little chance since the Estates General 
would unlikely alter a structure designed in its favour. Moreover, at a time when 
immigrants from the Southern Netherlands like De Moucheron, Lintgens, and Le Maire 
were slowly but surely sidelined by the Hollands majority, calls for more power coming 
from that corner were unlikely to be popular, whereas claims for free and fair trade 
opportunities would attract a wide audience (Gelderblom 1999). 
 Whatever his motives, Le Maire concentrated on his objections to the VOC 
board’s business policy and discussed only three main corporate governance complaints 
(Shareholder Rights 2009). First, the company’s rising debt burden cut into the 
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shareholders’ profits, so that no dividends had yet been paid and were unlikely to be paid 
before the 1612 accounts (Shareholder Rights 2009, 39, 40, 42, 45). Second, the 
dictatorial board refused to take advice or hear arguments. Third, the directors enriched 
themselves to the detriment of shareholders while trying to get the obligation to publish 
accounts waived (Shareholder Rights 2009, 39, 400-41, 45). The complaints amounted to 
a bill for the woeful impotence of shareholders: this had brought the latent conflict of 
interest between bondholders and shareholders to the fore and allowed the directors to get 
away with milking the company, which without public scrutiny of the accounts would 
continue indefinitely.  
In combination with the sweeping proposals of the 1606 WIC draft statutes, Le 
Maire’s complaints show that contemporaries were acutely aware of the VOC charter’s 
failings. Yet nothing was done. The Estates General duly lifted the company’s obligation 
to publish accounts and subsequent drafts for a WIC charter reverted to the VOC model, 
omitting the clauses on shareholder representation. Clearly the main principal wanted to 
keep a tight hold over its companies and ignored other interests.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
During the 16th century traditional partnerships evolved to meet new commercial 
demands in the scale and scope of business in the Low Countries. The flexible legal 
system enabled existing forms such as the shipping company and the partnership to adapt 
by developing arrangements to safeguard the interests of stakeholders and third parties, 
redefining liabilities and solving emerging agency issues. Tried and tested in the 
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developing long-distance trade of Antwerp and subsequently Amsterdam, this framework 
proved sufficiently flexible to accommodate the biggest challenge, the overseas trade 
with Asia.  
At first sight the VOC was a natural shoot off these old roots, and not a 
revolutionary innovation. Other companies had pioneered the joint-stock principle, the 
separation of ownership and management, limited liability, tradeable shares, and capital 
pledged for long periods of time. Yet the VOC differed materially from its predecessors: 
by its size, scope of operations, purpose, its durability, and by the creation of a lively 
securities trade. The company’s corporate governance structure also differed materially 
as a result of its need to combine colonial warfare with trade. As a compromise between 
existing commercial interests, reasons of state, and the business models available at the 
time, its governance model in fact came closest to other private-public partnerships in the 
Republic such as the admiralty boards. The deficiencies of this construction were quickly 
recognized, but never remedied. With the war against Spain and colonial conquest in full 
swing, reasons of state would not allow that, and turning the bewindhebbers positions 
into a key instrument for social and political advancement created a powerful lobby 
group firmly defending the status quo.  
 The very modern character of the equity market which emerged with the 
establishment of the VOC in 1602 has led legal and economic historians to overlook the 
deviant nature of the company’s governance structure. The VOC represented the 
culmination of a long evolution of corporate organization in several key respects: limited 
liability, freely transferable shares and securities trading, and a better definition of 
management functions and responsibilities. In those respects the company is a worthy 
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precursor of modern corporations and Dutch limited liability companies. However, the 
VOC’s corporate governance was a clear step backwards, a deviation both from the 
preceding evolution and from contemporary conceptions of business organization and 
accountability. Directors appointed by outsiders and sitting for life were an anomaly, as 
was the disregard for shareholders’ rights to information. It became the norm in the VOC, 
over vociferous protests from shareholders and prominent business men such as Le Maire 
and Usselinx, because reasons of state overrode the interests of private investors. Like the 
company’s permanent capital, its corporate governance model was the consequence of 
state intervention, not of a quest for greater economic efficiency.  
36 
 
References 
Asser,  Willem Daniël Hendrik. 1983. In solidum of pro parte, een onderzoek naar de 
ontwikkelingsgeschiedenis van de hoofdelijke en gedeelde aansprakelijkheid van vennoten 
tegenover derden. Leiden: Brill.  
Becht, Marco, Patrick Bolton and Ailsa Röell. 2003. Corporate governance and control. In 
Handbook of the Economics of Finance eds. G.M. Constantinides, M. Harris and R. Stulz, 
1-109. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Brakel, Simon van. 1908. De Hollandsche handelscompagnieën der zeventiende eeuw, hun 
ontstaan, hunne inrichting. The Hague: Nijhoff. 
Brakel, Simon van. 1909. Vroedschapsresolutiën, sententiën en notarieele acten 
betreffende de Noordsche Compagnie. Bijdragen en mededeelingen van het Historisch 
Genootschap 30: 255-400. 
Brakel, Simon van. 1912. Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis der naamlooze vennootschap. 
Rechtsgeleerd magazijn 31: 261-306. 
Brakel, Simon van. 1914. Ontbrekende schakels in ons vennootschapsrecht. In 
Rechtshistorische opstellen aangeboden aan mr. S.J. Fockema Andreae, 153-194. 
Haarlem: Bohn. 
Brakel, Simon van. 1917. Vennootschapsvormen in Holland gedurende de zeventiende 
eeuw. Rechtsgeleerd magazijn 36: 1-30, 145-189 
Brulez, Wilfrid. 1959. De firma Della Faille en de internationale handel van Vlaamse 
firma's in de 16e eeuw. Brussels: Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie. 
37 
 
Chys, Jacobus Anne van der. 1857. Geschiedenis der stichting van de Vereenigde O.I. 
Compagnie en der maatregelen van de Nederlandsche regering betreffende de vaart op 
Oost-Indië, welke aan deze stichting voorafgingen. Leiden: Engels. 
Colenbrander, Herman Theodoor.  1901. Über das erste Auftreten des Wortes “Aktie” in 
den Niederlanden. Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht 50: 383-387. 
Dekker, Cornelis, and Ronald Baetens. 2009. Geld in het water, Antwerps en Mechels 
kapitaal in Zuid-Beveland na de stormvloeden in de 16e eeuw. Hilversum: Verloren. 
Denucé, Jan. 1938. De Hanze en de Antwerpsche handelscompagnieën op de 
Oostzeelanden. Antwerpen: De Sikkel.  
De Roover, Raymond. 1963. The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank 1397-1494. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Deventer, Marinus Lodewijk van. 1862. Gedenkstukken van Johan van Oldenbarnevelt 
en zijn tijd, II, 1593-1602. The Hague: Nijhoff.  
Dillen, Johannes Gerard van. 1930. Isaac le Maire en de handel in actiën der Oost-
Indische Compagnie. Economisch-historisch jaarboek 16: 1-165. 
Dillen, Johannes Gerard van. 1958. Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister van de Kamer 
Amsterdam der Oost-Indische Compagnie. The Hague: Nijhoff. 
Fockema Andreae, Sybrandus Johannes. 1975. De Nederlandse staat onder de Republiek. 
Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij. 7th edition. 
Frentrop, Paul. 2003. A History of Corporate Governance, 1602-2002. Brussels: Deminor. 
Gaastra, Femme. 2009. De geschiedenis van de VOC. Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 7th edition. 
Gelder, Hendrik Enno van. 1916. Scheepsrekeningen van enkele der vroegste 
Guineavaarten. Economisch Historisch Jaarboek 2: 239-57. 
38 
 
Gelderblom, Oscar C. 1999.  De deelname van Zuid-Nederlandse kooplieden aan het 
openbare leven van Amsterdam  (1578-1650). In Ondernemers en bestuurders, economie 
en politiek in de Noordelijke Nederlanden in de late Middeleeuwen en de Vroegmoderne 
Tijd, ed. Clé Lesger and Leo Noordegraaf, 237-258. Amsterdam: NEHA. 
Gelderblom, Oscar C. 2000. Zuid-Nederlandse kooplieden en de opkomst van de 
Amsterdamse stapelmarkt 1578-1630. Hilversum: Verloren. 
Gelderblom, Oscar C., and Joost P.B. Jonker. 2004. Completing a Financial Revolution, 
the Finance of the Dutch East India Trade and the Rise of the Amsterdam Capital Market, 
1595-1612. Journal of Economic History 64: 641-672. 
Gelderblom, forthcoming. The Freedom of Merchants, the Institutional Foundations of 
International Trade in the Low Countries, 1250-1650. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Gepken-Jager Ella, Gerard van Solingen and Levinus Timmerman. 2005. VOC 1602-2002 : 
400 years of company law. Deventer: Kluwer.  
Goor, Jur van. 2002. De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in de historiografie, 
imperialist en multinational. In De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tussen oorlog en 
diplomatie, ed. Gerrit Knaap and Ger Teitler, 9-33. Leiden: KITLV. 
Goris, Jan Albert. 1925. Étude sur les colonies marchandes mériodinales (Portugais, 
Espagnols, Italiens) à Anvers de 1488- à 1567. Contribution à l'histoire des débuts du 
capitalisme moderne. Louvain: Librairie Universitaire. 
Haak, Simon, and Augustus Veenendaal, eds. 1962. Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, 
bescheiden betreffende zijn staatkundig beleid en zijn familie 1570-1620, II, 1602-1613. 
The Hague: Nijhoff. 
39 
 
Harris, Ron. 2000. Industrializing English Law. Entrepreneurship and Business 
Organization, 1720-1844. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hart, Simon. 1976. De eerste Nederlandse tochten ter walvisvaart. In Geschrift en getal, 
een keuze uit de demografisch-, economisch- en sociaal-historische studiën op grond van 
Amsterdamse archivalia, 1600-1800, 209-246. Dordrecht: Historische Vereniging 
Holland. 
Heijden, Egidius Johannes Josephus van der. 1908. De ontwikkeling van de naamlooze 
vennootschap in Nederland vóór de codificatie. Amsterdam: Van der Vecht. 
Heijden, Egidius Johannes Josephus van der. 1914. Over den juridischen oorsprong der 
Naamlooze Vennootschap. In Rechtshistorische opstellen aangeboden aan mr. S.J. 
Fockema Andreae, 132-152. Haarlem: Bohn. 
Heijer, Henk den. 2005. De geoctrooieerde compagnie, de VOC en de WIC als 
voorlopers van de naamloze vennootschap. Deventer: Kluwer. 
Hoecke, Gielis vanden. 1537/1545. Een sonderlinghe boeck in dye edel conste 
arithmetica: met veel schoone perfecte regulen als Die numeracie vanden ghetale metten 
specien int gheheele ende int ghebroken .../ Ghecalculeert ende versaemt met grooter 
naersticheyt bi Gielis vanden Hoecke, En geprent Thantwerpen op die Lombaerde veste. 
By mi Symon Cock. Antwerpen.  
Hunt, Edwin S. 1994. The Medieval Super-Companies. A Study of the Peruzzi Company 
of Florence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Israel, Jonathan. 1989. Dutch primacy in world trade. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jameson, John F. 1887. Willem Usselincx. New York: Putnam. 
40 
 
Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (No. 
4): 305-360. 
 
Jonge,  Jan Karel Jakob de. 1862. De opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indië 
(1595-1811), vol I. The Hague: Nijhoff. 
Jonge,  Jan Karel Jakob de. 1865. De opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indië 
(1595-1811), vol III. The Hague: Nijhoff.  
Jong, Michiel de. 205. 'Staat van oorlog':wapenbedrĳf en militaire hervorming in de 
Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden, 1585-1621. Hilversum: Verloren 
Jonker, Joost P.B., and Keetie E. Sluyterman. 2000. At home on the world markets, Dutch 
trading houses from the 16th century to the present. The Hague: SDU. 
Lazzareschi, Eugenio. 1947. Libro della Communità dei Mercanti Lucchesi in Bruges. 
Milan: Malfasi. 
Lehmann, Karolus. 1895. Die geschichtliche Entwicklung des Aktienrechts bis zum Code de 
Commerce. Berlin: Heymann. 
Ligtenberg, Clara. 1914. Willem Usselincx. Utrecht: Oosthoek.  
Lopez, Robert S. 1971.The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950-1350. 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall 
Lopez, Robert S., and Irving W. Raymond. 1955. Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean 
World. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Mansvelt, Willem Maurits Frederik. 1922. Rechtsvorm en financieel beheer bij de VOC. 
Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger. 
41 
 
Meijer, A.C. 1986. ”Liefhebbers des Vaderlandts ende beminders van de commercie”, de 
plannen tot oprichting van een Generale Westindische Compagnie gedurende de jaren 
1606-1609.  Archief, mededelingen van het Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der 
Wetenschappen:  21-72. 
Nanninga Uitterdijk, J. 1904. Een Kamper handelshuis te Lissabon 1572-1594, 
handelscorrespondentie, rekeningen en bescheiden. Zwolle: Tijl. 
Rees, Otto van. 1868. Geschiedenis der koloniale politiek van de Republiek der 
Vereenigde Nederlanden. Utrecht: Kemink. 
Riemersma, Jelle. 1952. Trading and shipping associations in 16th century Holland. 
Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis 65: 330-338. 
Resolutien Staten Generaal (RSG), consulted online at 
http://www.inghist.nl/retroboeken/statengeneraal/  
Schöffer, Ivo. 1956. De vonnissen in averij grosse van de Kamer van Assurantie en 
Avarij te Amsterdam in de 18e eeuw. Onderzoek naar hun economisch-historische 
waarde voor de geschiedenis van handel en scheepvaart van Amsterdam op de Oostzee 
1700-1770. Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek 26: 73-132. 
Scott, William Robert. 1968. The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish, and Irish 
Joint-Stock Companies to 1720. Gloucester Mass.: P. Smith. 
Shareholder Rights at 400, Commemorating Isaac Le Maire and the First Recorded 
Expression of Investor Advocacy 2009. S.l.: APG. 
Steensgaard, Niels. 1982. The Dutch East India Company as an institutional innovation. In 
Dutch capitalism and world capitalism, ed Maurice Aymard, 235-257. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
42 
 
Tielhof, Milja van. 2002. The ‘Mother of All Trades’. The Baltic Grain Trade in 
Amsterdam from the Late 16th to the Early 19th Century. Leiden: Brill. 
Unger, Willem Sybrand. 1940. Nieuwe gegevens betreffende het begin der vaart op 
Guinea. Economisch Historisch Jaarboek 21: 194-217. 
Unger, Willem Sybrand. 1946-1948. Het inschrijvingsregister van de Kamer Zeeland der 
Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie. Economisch Historisch Jaarboek 24: 1-33. 
Veluwenkamp, Jan Willem. 2002. Archangel. Nederlandse ondernemers in Rusland 
1550-1785. Amsterdam: Balans. 
Vries, Jan de, and Ad van der Woude. 1997. The first modern economy, success, failure, 
and perseverance of the Dutch economy, 1500-1815. Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press. 
Wijnroks, Eric. 2003. Handel tussen Rusland en de Nederlanden, 1560-1640. Hilversum: 
Verloren. 
Witteveen, Menno. 2002. Een onderneming van landsbelang. De oprichting van de 
Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in 1602. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
Zimmermann, Reinhard. 1990. The Law of Obligations. Roman Foundations of the 
Civilian Tradition. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Zwet, Han van. 2009. Lofwaerdighe dijckagies en miserabele polders, een financiële 
analyse van landaanwinningsprojecten in Hollands Noorderkwartier, 1597-1643. 
Hilversum: Verloren. 
 
Notes 
43 
 
                                                 
1
 We are indebted to Matthijs de Jongh and Judith Pollman for pointing us to sources 
which helped to shape the argument of this paper, and to the participants of conferences 
and seminars at Yale, Antwerp University, the University of Amsterdam, Utrecht 
University, and CalTech for their constructive comments. Rienk Wegener Sleeswijk 
made us understand the precise legal character of early shipping companies; Ailsa Röell 
gave very useful detailed comments. 
2
 The original documents lie in the Dutch National Archives, the Hague (henceforth NA) 
3.01.14 Van Oldenbarnevelt no. 3123. Cf. De Jonge 1865, 364-378, and Haak and 
Veenendaal 1962, 293-294 for transcriptions. An English translation in Shareholder 
Rights 2009. 
3
 According to De Vries and Van der Woude 1997, 385 the directors of the predecessors 
did not enjoy third-party limited liability, whereas Den Heijer 2005, 35-36, thinks they 
did. 
4
 To be sure, this kind of adaptation of the general partnership can be traced back to the 
Justinian code: Zimmerman 1990, 457-459. 
5
 Maritime law also provided for an equal distribution of damages among all freighters in 
case the cargo of only some of them was damaged or lost (thrown overboard) in order to 
safe the ship: Schöffer 1956. 
6
 For most participants it would have been easy to establish with their own eyes when and 
in what condition ships returned, but managers usually informed those living elsewhere 
by letter: Van Gelder 1916, Unger 1940. 
7
 Ships from different companies coordinated their operations so as to maximize mutual 
security. In 1601 two captains, one from Rotterdam and one from Amsterdam, signed a 
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contract of agreeing on a joint return voyage with mutual assistance and defence, secured 
on their ships and with penalties for non-compliance of up to 1,000 guilders: Unger 1940, 
214-217. 
8
 NA 1.04.01 Inv. Nrs. 3 and 4, printed in De Jonge 1862, 204-212, 249-253. 
9
 NA 1.04.01, Inv. Nr. 27, fol. 4v (30 November 1598), fol. 12v (2 September 1599); fol. 
30 (3 September 1600); NA 1.04.01 Inv. Nr 29, fol. 2 (13 October 1601). 
10
 NA 1.04.01 Inv. Nr. 27, fol. 45v (30 December 1600). See for a discussion about the 
relationship between shareholders, directors, and the company Van Dillen 1930, 353-354. 
That they did have a direct relation with the company is clear from De Jonge 1862, 97, 
article 24. 
11
 See, for instance, for the fifth voyage: NA 1.04.01, Inv. Nr. 27, Fol 34 (12 August 
1600). 
12
 NA 1.04.01, Inv. Nr. 27, fol. 2 (16 November 1598); compare a resolution on the 
submission of accounts by individual directors in NA 1.04.01 Inv. Nr .28, fol. 7 (4 
October 1600). 
13
 On storage: NA 1.04.01. Inv. Nr. 28, Fol. 1 (19 July 1599): on Texel: NA 1.04.01, Inv. 
Nr. 27, fol. 29 (12 June 1600). See also: NA 1.04.01 Inv. Nr .29, fol. 2 (13 October 
1601), fol. 3 (29 October 1601). 
14
 NA 1.04.01, Inv. Nr. 89. See also Inv. Nr. 27, Fol 5 (4 January 1599). At times the 
directors also personally took financial risks for the company. In July 1600 for instance 
six directors together insured, until its moment of sailing, a newly bought ship for 10,000 
guilders. In the end the policy ran until July 1601: NA 1.04. 01 Inv. Nr. 27, Fol 29v (7 
July 1600); Fol 30v-31, 16 April 1601. 
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15
 Amsterdam’s Oude Compagnie set the rate for these rebates at 8-9 per cent in 1599 
(NA. 1.04.01, Inv. Nr 27, fol. 16v (7 October 1599); Inv. Nr. 28, fol. 7 (7 October 1599) 
and 8 per cent in 1600 and 1601 (NA 1.04.01, Inv. Nr. 27, Fol 34 (12 August 1600); NA 
1.04.01 Inv. Nr. 29, fol. 10 (2 October 1601). 
16
 NA 1.04.01, Inv. Nr 29, fol. 4 (26 November 1601). 
17
 NA 1.04.01, Inv. Nr 29, fol. 4 (15 November 1601). 
18
 See, for instance, NA 1.04.01 Inv. Nr. 1 (3 December 1594) for the directors of 
Amsterdam’s Oude Compagnie assuming joint and several liability for cannon borrowed 
on the company’s behalf, printed in De Jonge 1862, 239-242. 
19
 ‘Adi 7 december ao 98 is bovengemelde […?] geschut in die generale vergaederynghe 
en spetialijcken die bewynthebberen daer op geroepen, gheproponeert, en oock by alle 
geaccepteert en geapprobeert’, NA. 1.04.01 Inv. Nr. 27, fol 4v (7 December 1598). Other 
general meetings are noted on 14 December and 25 February, but the addition of ‘ter 
presentie van alle die bewynthebberen, alleenlyck absent synde [namen]’ (with all 
directors present, only [named individuals] being absent) appears to suggest that the 
meeting was for directors only. (NA. 1.04.01 Inv. Nr. 27, fols. 5 and 6). By August 1599 
the term general meeting stands for a meeting of the directors: ‘vergaderinge vande 
generale bewinthebbers’ (NA 1.04.01, Inv. Nr. 27, fol. 12v). The power shift from the 
shareholders to the directors is exquisitely illustrated by a subtle mistake in the draft 
minutes about directors each paying part of a bill for cannon. Having started the word 
participant, the writer crossed this beginning out and replaced it with ‘bewynthebber’ or 
director: ‘Aen 7 december ao 98 is gearresteert dat yder particip bewynthebber zal tot 
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zynen laste neemen voor reeckenynghe van tgeresikeerde gheschut die somme van 
seshondertenvyfftyck gl corent’, NA. 1.04.01 Inv. Nr. 27, fol 4v (7 December 1598).  
20
 NA 1.04.01, Inv. Nr. 28, fol. 5 (23 August 1599). On March 1, 1599, ‘vergaderingynge 
van die colleganten en diverse der bewynthebberen’ (NA 1.04.01, Inv. Nr. 27, fol. 6). See 
also: NA 1.04.01, Inv. Nr 28, fol. 6 (30 August 1599). 
21
 NA 1.04.01 Inv. Nr. 28, fol. 5: ‘Dat ijegelick particulier Collegie volcomen macht heeft 
om aff te doen t’geene aen haer werck dependeert ende swaricheyt maeckende, ofte onder 
haer discorderrende, vermogen den Raedt vant Collegie te hulpe te nemen’. This clause is 
added to the resolution of 23 August 1599 in a different handwriting, so the exact date 
remains uncertain.  
22
 NA 1.04.01, Inv. Nr. 27 Fol. 22v (11 January 1600) Fol. 33 (25 July 1600); See also: 
NA 1.04.01 Inv. Nr. 28, fol. 19 (11 January 1600). See also the resolution, struck out in 
the draft index, stating that all directors regardless of their specific tasks had equal voting 
power (NA 1.04.01, Inv. Nr. 27, fol. 2 (16 November 1598). 
23
 NA 1.04.01, Inv. Nr. 27, fol. 6 (25 February 1599), fol. 17 (9 October 1599); NA 
1.04.01 Inv. Nr. 28, fol. 5 (23 August 1599), fol. 8 (9 October 2009). See also Witteveen 
2002, 40. 
24
 NA. 1.04.01 Inv. Nr. 27, fol. 20v (15 November 1599). 
25
 NA 1.04.01, Inv. Nr. 29, fol. 4 (15 November 1601, 2 April 1602).  
26
 Pamphlet Knuttel No. 3347, Tegen-vertooch bij eenighe lief-hebbers vande waarheyt 
ende haer Vaderlandt ende mede participanten vande Oost-Indische Compagnie aen de 
Ed. Hoog. Moog. heeren Staten Generael, 1622. 
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27
 We follow the text of the 1602 charter as printed in Van der Chys 1857, 118-135. An 
English translation may be found in Gepken-Jager, Van Solingen and Timmerman 2005, 
and on http://www.australiaonthemap.org.au/content/view/50/59. 
28
 The proposal for a Casa de India structure probably dated from 1600 or 1601. The 
1602 merger talks initially appear to have envisaged the executive committee of XVII 
bewindhebbers as a semi-public board for the Asian trade, though without shareholder 
representation, but this idea no longer appeared in the second draft: De Jonge 1862, 262, 
272. However, the final document summarizing the outcome of the talks still referred to 
the company’s board as a ‘gemeene collegie van den Oost-Indischen handel’, i.e. a 
general board for the trade with East India, De Jonge 1862, 278, Van Deventer 1862, 301. 
As late as 1622 Usselinx still pleaded for a public board charged with running the Asian 
trade and headed by the stadholder: Van Rees 1868, 424-427, 455. Alexander Bick is 
preparing a PhD thesis at Princeton on the WIC’s governance.  
29
 We counted charter articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18-23, 24-25, 26, 
27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 42 as dealing with aspects of corporate governance. 
30
 Van der Chys 1857, 130, article 35. Senior VOC officers therefore had to swear an 
oath of allegiance to both the company and to the Estates General. 
31
 Van der Chys 1857, 118-135, counting articles 7, 9, 10, 14, and 17. 
32
 The initial document and the second draft drawn up by the merger committee had 
specified a threshold of ten per cent: De Jonge 1862, 266, 273. 
33
 De Jonge 1862, 97, article 24 of the regulations concerning the expedition crew, 
referring to the contract between the participants.  
34
 This was already the case with the first expedition: Van Dillen 1930, 355-356. 
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35
 Van der Chys 1857, 118-135, counting articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 12, 18-23, 24-25, 26, 27, 28, 
29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 42. 
36
 Cf. Usselinx’ comments comparing the bewindhebbers to the boards of orphanages, 
church wards, and hospitals in Van Rees 1868, 417. 
37
 Van der Chys 1857, 118-135, counting articles 6, 15-16, 26, 34-36, 38, 39, 41, 44, 45. 
38
 Van der Chys 1857, 118-135, counting articles 6, 15-16, 26, 34-36, 38, 39, 41, 44, 45. 
39
 For examples from the company’s early years, see RSG 1604-1606, 501 (borrowing 
warships and ordnance), p. 501-502 (sanctions for late paying shareholders), 805 (new 
admonition to tardy shareholders), 808 (renewed publication of the monopoly and the 
penalties for disobeying it), 809 (ban on VOC crew to enlist in foreign service); RSG 
1607-1609, 306 (official share transfer procedure and renewed sanctions for late paying 
shareholders), 307 (loans of cannon and ammunition), 729 (instructions to the 
ambassador in Paris to do everything in his power to frustrate the French plans for an 
Asian trading company), 896 (supply of ammunition and guns worth 25,000 guilders for 
the defense of forts). From 1609 the Estates General gave the company a regular annual 
assistance of 100,000 guilders in cash, on military costs which the company claimed in 
1610 to amount to 420,000 guilders: RSG 1610-1612, 254; cf. 507 for the tax benefit 
granted in return for a loan of 250,000 guilders which the company had given to the state 
during 1605-1606, and 511 for a gift of spices from the directors to the members of the 
Estates General. Cf. Den Heijer 2005, 55, putting the first subsidy only in 1611, whereas 
it is clear from the resolutions that this was two years before. For the ban on naked 
shorting RSG 1610-1612, 16-17 and 44; this was promulgated on 27 February, cf. Van 
Dillen 1930, 68-69. 
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40
 For instance RSG 1602-1603, 88, 299 (consulting the Estates General on a successor to 
De Moucheron as director), 297-298 (various administrative issues on getting the 
company started up); RSG 1604-1606, 223-224 (forming a committee of directors to 
advise the Estates General on Spains position in Asia), 506 (discussing the equipment of 
new warships); RSG 1607-1609, 11 (coordinating naval matters between the admiralties 
and the company), 12-13 (discussing the commander of a next expedition), 893-895 
(discussions whether or not to include Asia in the truce with Spain); RSG 1610-1612, 694 
(latest news from Asia).  
41
 “Secrete Instructie den Admiral Van der Hagen gegeven”, NA 1.11.01.01 Inv. Nr 255, 
fol. 71-74; printed in De Jonge 1865, 163. Cf. Van Brakel 1908, 21. 
42
 RSG 1604-1606, 806; the request was refused, the Estates General instructing the board 
to fill any vacancies as laid down in the charter. 
43
 Van Rees 1868, 29, 31, 33-34. The efforts by De Moucheron and Lintgens to set up 
trading companies abroad inspired the VOC board to have Le Maire swear an oath that he 
would not compete with the company; this did not, however, deter him.  
44
 Van Rees 1868, 27: from 1605 to 1610 respectively 15, 75, 40, 20, 25, 50 per cent for a 
total of 225. Van Rees erroneously attributes these dividends to the VOC, which paid its 
first dividend only in 1610. Article 9 gave shareholders in the last expedition of the 
voorcompagnieën the right to opt out. The Delft shareholder W.J. Dedel had clearly done 
this and, having received 130 per cent by 1607, he sold his share: Colenbrander 1901, 
386-387. 
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45
 The published resolutions of the Estates General do not show when the board first 
requested the lifting of this obligation, but the Frisian Estates considered it during 1610 
and asked the Estates General in April 1611 to turn it down: RSG 1610-1612, 359. 
46
 According to Usselinx, the hoofdparticipanten were later dropped at the instigation of 
representatives from the country’s main ports, i.e. bewindhebbers from the VOC who 
feared that they would have to introduce a similar structure: Van Rees 1868, 411, 423. 
47
 Usselinx considered ten per cent inadvisable and thought apparently that no figure 
should be mentioned: Van Rees 1868, 452. 
48
 Information kindly provided by Alexander Bick from his ongoing research. 
49
 For subsequent convoluted developments surrounding the WIC see Den Heijer 2005, 
45-50. Usselinx’ complaint about WIC draft reflecting the repression of shareholders as 
practised by the VOC quoted in Van Rees 1868, 409. 
50
 NA 1.04.02 Inv. Nr. 7060, ledger of shareholders fols. 90, 102, 114, 121, 182-191, 
193-194, 196, 198, 201. 
